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POINT I 
AFTER NOVEMBER 16,1992, BOTH PARTIES ACKNOWLEDGED 
THAT THEIR AGREEMENT WAS STILL BINDING 
BY THEIR ACTIONS AND STATEMENTS 
The Defendants in their brief acknowledged the existence of an oral agreement after 
November 16,1992 but allege that Young's breached the same when they withdrew their funds from 
escrow in December of 1993 (Appellees' brief at 7,15 and 17). The Defendants' trial brief then goes 
on to quote Olsen that there was never any agreement that Young's could withdraw the funds from 
escrow and that he had no further obligation to sell the property to Young's (Appellees' brief at 17) 
(R. 2003 at 427). 
Young, on the other hand, testified that when he learned that the deed had not been recorded 
and that Olsen had not received the funds, he went to Olsen and talked to him about withdrawing the 
money from the Title Company and Olsen's response was, "fine, I can't have the money anyway." 
(TT. 135,184-185,215-216, 225-226, 250,262-263). 
1 
Olsen's testimony on cross-examination conflicts with his testimony quoted in Appellee's 
brief. Olsen testified as follows: 
BY MR. NEELEY: 
Q. You agreed with after December of 1992, do you agree that you were going to 
clear off the title problems, the judgment liens and still sell the property to Mr. Young 
at that time? 
A. I was going to, I told him I would try to do that, yes sir. 
Q. You didn't do that, right? 
A. No, it didn't happen. 
Q. The agreement was though that as soon as you did do that that you would sell the 
property to Mr. Young. 
A. Well, that was part of the agreement, if I could get it cleared up, it would then be 
financed by the bank and so forth and the deed would be recorded, yes. 
TT. 430-431 
The above statement substantiates Young's testimony that Olsen gave his approval of the 
withdrawal of the funds and that when the title problems are cleared up "it would then be financed 
by the bank and so forth and the deed would be recorded." (emphasis added). Olsen clearly 
understood that the money was going back to the bank and that the bank would be providing funds 
after the title problems were cleared up. 
Olsen claims that he went to the Title Company in January of 1994 to see if he could get 
interest on the $10,000.00 (TT. 76). Mark Anderson at the Title Company remembers no such 
request (TT. 315). In addition, Mark Anderson testified that Olsen was not surprised when he told 
him the money had been withdrawn in a conversation with him in December of 1993 (TT. 316-317). 
After the failed closing on November 16,1992, the parties obviously had an agreement that 
Olsen would use his best efforts to clear the liens and that the deal would close with funds coming 
from the bank. 
2 
There was no waiver by the Young's to enforce the contract when they withdrew the funds. 
Olsen knew and acquiesced in the same. Utah Appellate Court's construction of an applicable legal 
standard is review for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's interpretation of the law. 
See Jensen v IP A, 977 P.2d 474,477 (Utah 1999). The trial court clearly applied the wrong standard 
in its interpretation of the facts to the law in this matter. 
POINT II 
THE PARTIES5 ACTIONS, AFTER THE FAILED CLOSING IN 
NOVEMBER 1992, ILLUSTRATE A LACK OF WAIVER 
Appellees argue in their brief that Young's waived their claim for specific performance of the 
contract when they withdrew the funds in December of 1993. The parties' actions, completely 
ignored by the trial court, conflict with the notion that Olsen considered the contract terminated or 
waived (Appellees' Trial Brief pg. 10). 
Young's remained in possession of the property and farmed the same until October 
of 1994 (TT. 140,141,148, 249, Exh. 8 and 9). 
Young's paid the taxes and assessments for 1994. 
Olsen never demanded lease payments or rent for 1993 and 1994. 
Olsen told the Title Company that he had attorney Dale Dorius working on clearing 
the liens (TT. 70,315,324) 
Olsen took the 1993 tax notice to Young's for them to pay (R. 1713 at f36(a), TT. 
72-73,135, Exh. #16). 
Olsen approached the Young's in June of 1994 and asked them to trade the 10.48 
acres for other ground (TT. 80-81, 141-143). 
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Olsen retained the $480 purchase proceeds and continues to do so (R. 1713 at f21, 
TT.266,Exh.#15). 
Utah Courts have observed that the intent to abandon contract rights need not be shown by 
the positive testimony of the purchaser, but may be inferred from the acts and conduct of the 
purchaser that are "clearly inconsistent with an intention to continue the use of the property." Adair 
v Bracken, 745 P.2d 849.851 (UtahCt. App. 1987). quoting Forsyth v Pendelton. 617 P.2d 358,361 
(Utah 1980). 
The actions by the Young's can only be regarded as unequivocal expressions of intent to hold 
Olsen to the contract terms. Olsen's lack of action and his request that Young's trade the 10.48 acres 
for other property illustrate Olsen's acknowledgment of his continuing obligation to fulfill the 
contract terms. 
POINT III 
YOUNG'S WERE NOT DILATORY IN THEIR 
EFFORTS TO ENFORCE THE CONTRACT 
Appellees point out in their brief that Utah Courts have generally allowed a reasonable time 
for sellers to perfect title (Appellees' brief at pg. 12). See also Callister v Millstream Assocs., Inc., 
738 P.2d 662, 664 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
The Utah Supreme Court has articulated three options for the non-breaching party when there 
is an anticipatory breach of contract. The Supreme Court in Hurwitz v David K. Richards Co., 436 
P.2d 794, 796 (Utah 1968), set forth the options as follows: 
1. Treat the entire contract as broken and sue for damages. 
2. Treat the contract as still binding and wait until the time arrived for its performance 
and at such time bring an action on the contract. 
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3. Rescind the contract and sue for money paid or for value of the services or property 
furnished. 
Young's chose the second option, that is, they chose not to terminate the contract but to 
encourage and allow Olsen a reasonable period of time to cure the defects. 
Young's approach follows the modern rule in regards to anticipatory breach of contract that 
an innocent party, confronted with an anticipatory repudiation may continue to treat the contract as 
operable and urge performance by the repudiating party without waiving any right to sue for that 
repudiation." Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v Combe, 799 P.2d 716,725 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting United 
California Bank v Prudential Ins. Co., Etc., 681 P.2d 390, 433 (Ct. App. 1983). The basis for the 
modern rule is to give the breaching party the opportunity to cure the breach before the time for 
performance is due. After all, a "party that has received a definite repudiation from the breaching 
party to the contract should not be penalized for its efforts to encourage the breaching party to 
perform its end of the bargain." United California Bank, 681 P.2d at 433. 
The Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v Combe case is similar to the Young situation. In Breuer-
Harrison, the parties entered into an agreement in 1979 for the sale and purchase of a large tract of 
land for developmental purposes. The agreement called for periodic payments by the purchasers to 
the sellers over a five year period. In late 1983 the purchasers learned of an encumbrance on the land 
and made attempts to mitigate their damages but eventually sued for recission in late 1984. In 
upholding the trial court's grant of summary judgment for recission, the Court quoted the above-
stated rules and went on to say that there is sound policy reasons to not blindly require a non-
breaching party to rescind immediately upon discovering the breach, even where the breach cannot 
be repaired because a non-breaching party may appropriately attempt in good faith to mitigate 
5 
damages by attempting to honor the contract and work around problems presented by the breach. 
Breuer-Harrison at 726. The Court found no waiver by the purchasers even though the contract had 
closed five years previously and the encumbrance was known for at least a year. 
In the present matter Young's became aware of title defects, whether from Olsen or the Title 
Company makes no difference. Olsen agreed to cure the title defects (TT. 78, 93-94, 415). Olsen 
told the Title Company and the Young's that he had an attorney working on clearing the 
encumbrances (TT. 69, 309-310, 313). 
Young's reasonably relied upon the representations from Olsen that he would clear the 
encumbrances. Young's paid taxes, thirteen (13) months of payments, farmed and possessed the 
ground. It wasn't until Olsen approached Young in June of 1994 to trade the ground to Patterson 
that they had any concern that Olsen would not do what he had promised. Young's even attempted 
to contact Olsen's creditors to work out the encumbrances (TT. 146). 
In August of 1994, when Young's sent the remaining purchase proceeds to Olsen through his 
attorney, that is the first time the Young's could reasonably have had knowledge of Olsen's intended 
breach. Prior to August 1994, it is true the Young's knew of the encumbrance, but as set forth above 
by the Supreme Court in Hunvitz, Young's had the option to treat the contract as still binding and 
wait until he time arrived for its performance. 
Based upon the representations by Olsen that he would attempt to cure the defects in title, 
it was not unreasonable for the Young's to rely on those representations and foregoing bringing an 
action on the contract. 
In regards to the withdrawal of the funds from the Title Company, Young's had an affirmative 
duty to mitigate the possible damages. The Utah Court of Appeals in Breuer-Harrison, Inc. said, 
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"Even where the breach cannot be repaired, a non-breaching party may appropriately attempt in good 
faith to mitigate damages by attempting to honor the contract and work around problems presented 
by the breach." Id. at 726. The Young's appropriately sought ways to mitigate the damage done by 
the encumbrances. They paid off the loan so as not to accumulate additional interest, and they 
contacted Olsen's lender. 
The trial court misapplied the law to the evidence in this case. The finding of waiver by the 
Young's based upon the withdrawal of the funds from the Title Company is in error. Young's had 
an obligation to mitigate their damages and are permitted under the Supreme Court options in 
Hurwitz to try and work out a resolution of the cause for breach and to continue to urge Olsen to 
perform. An anticipatory breach occurs when a party to an executory contract manifests a positive 
and unequivocal intent to not render its promised performance when the time fixed for it in the 
contract arrives. Hurwitz at 796. Olsen had promised to clear the liens. Young's did not have a 
clear "positive and unequivocal" indication from Olsen that he was not going to perform until he 
deeded the property to Patterson Construction. Bringing a lawsuit within a month after the deed is 
recorded is reasonable. 
Alternatively, Olsen delivered a properly executed Warranty Deed to the Young's that carries 
statutory covenants against encumbrances under Section 57-1-12, Utah Code Annotated. 
Utah Code Annotated §57-1-12 (1990) specifies the effect of a warranty deed as follows: 
Such deed when executed as required by law shall have the effect of a 
conveyance in fee simple... with covenants from the grantor... that the 
premises are free from all encumbrances... Any exceptions to such covenants 
may be briefly inserted in such deed following the description of the land. 
(quoting Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v Combe, 799 P.2d 716 (Utah App. 1990). 
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Young's were not dilatory in this undertaking. Olsen came to them in June of 1994 to seek 
an exchange of property for the 10.48 acres. The present action was filed in October of 1994, after 
making two attempts to tender the sale proceeds to Olsen and after he had recorded the Warranty 
Deed to Patterson Construction. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court has misapplied the law to the evidence in this case. Olsen breached the parties' 
agreement. Young's exercised their option to continue the contract and attempt a resolution of the 
title defects. Young's were not dilatory in their efforts nor did they waive the right to enforce the 
agreement. 
This Court should set aside the orders of the Trial Court and award the property to the 
Young's. 
DATED this 2° day of January, 2000. 
DOUGKAS L. NEELEY 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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